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ABSTRACT 
 
Valuation is a sophisticated topic which has been discussed for years either by academic 
people and by professionals. There are several technics used in order to be able to 
determine the value of any company : Discounted cash flows, price to earnings ratio, 
market-to-book value ratio, etc). The essential point in valuation concept is the term “cost 
of equity”. There are famous theorems such as Gordon Model and Modigliani-Miller 
discussing about this concept and about its effects on the firm value.  
This study aims to forecast the cost of equity, which is used for valuation, of a few certain 
Turkish firms listed on IMKB, according to Gordon Model and  to compare the forecasted 
costs with the realized ones. Consequently, there are evident deviations between the 
forecasted costs and the realized ones which implicitly explains that the the model may not 
always perform realistic outcomes in the surrounding market conditions. 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
Değerleme, gerek akademisyenler gerek kurumsal profesyoneller tarafından uzun yıllardır 
tartışılan oldukça karmaşık bir kavramdır. Bir şirketi değerleyebilmek için kullanılan 
çeşitli yöntemler mevcuttur : iskontolanmış nakit akımları, fiyat-kazanç oranı, piyasa-
defter değeri oranı, vb).  
Değerleme konusunun en hassas noktası “özkaynak maliyeti” kavramıdır. Bu konuda 
yazılmış ünlü teoriler arasında Gordon Modeli, ve Modigliani-Miller modelleri 
gösterilebilir.  
Bu çalışma, şirket değerlemesinde kullanılan özkaynak maliyetinin, Đ.M.K.B. ‘ye kote olan 
bazı şirketler için Gordon Modeli’ne göre tahmin edilmesi ve tahmin edilen maliyetin 
gerçekleşen maliyet ile karşılaştırmasını yapmaktadır. Tahmin edilen özkaynak maliyeti ile 
gerçekleşen özkaynak maliyeti belirgin oranda sapmalar göstermektedir. Bu sapmalar da 
kullanılan özkaynak maliyeti tahminleme modellerinin, içinde bulunulan  piyasa 
koşullarında gerçekçi sonuçlar üretmeyebileceğini açıklamaktadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In finance, valuation is the process of estimating the potential market value 
of a financial asset or liability. Valuations can be done on assets (for 
example, investments in marketable securities such as stocks, options, 
business enterprises, or  intangible assets such as patents and trademarks) or 
on liabilities (e.g., Bonds issued by a company). Valuations are required in 
many contexts including investment analysis, capital budgeting, merger and 
acquisition transactions, financial reporting, taxable events to determine the 
proper tax liability, and in litigation. 
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2. VALUATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 
 
Valuation of financial assets is made using : 
. Discounted Cash Flows to determine the value by estimating the expected 
future earnings from owning the asset discounted to their present value 
(Damodaran A.,2002, Investment Valuation).  
. Relative value models which determine the value based on the market 
prices of similar assets.  
. Option pricing models that are used for certain types of financial assets 
(e.g., warrants, put options, call options, employee stock options, 
investments with embedded options such as a callable bond) and which are 
complex present value models. The most common option pricing models are 
the Black-Scholes-Merton models and lattice models.  
Common terms for the value of an asset or liability are fair market value, 
fair value, and intrinsic value. The meanings of these terms differ. The most 
common sets market price. For instance, when an analyst believes a stock's 
intrinsic value is greater than its market price, the analyst makes a "buy" 
recommendation and vice versa. Moreover, an asset's intrinsic value may be 
subject to personal opinion and vary among analysts (Brealey, Myers, 
Marcus, “Fundementals of Corporate Finance”). 
 
2.1 Discounted Cash Flows Method 
This method estimates the value of an asset, based upon  its expected future 
cash flows, which are discounted to present. This concept of discounting 
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future cash flows is commonly known as the time value of money. For 
instance, an asset that matures and pays $1 in one year is worth less than $1 
today. The size of the discount is based on the opportunity cost of capital 
and it is expressed as a percentage. This percentage is the discount rate. 
The opportunity cost can be illustrated in an example. A person with only 
$100 to invest can make only one investment of $100 even if he is presented 
two or more investment choices. If this person is later offered an alternative 
investment choice, the investor has lost the opportunity to make that second 
investment since the $100 is spent to buy the first opportunity. This example 
illustrates that money is limited and people make choices in how to spend it. 
By making a choice, they give up other opportunities. 
The rate of the opportunity cost is based on a relation between the risk and 
return of some sort of investment. Classic economic theory maintains that 
people are rational and averse to risk. They, therefore, need an incentive to 
accept risk (Shapiro A. C., “Multinational Financial Management”). The 
incentive in finance comes in the form of higher expected returns after 
buying a risky asset. In other words, the more risky the investment, the more 
return investors want from that investment. Using the same example as 
above, assume the first investment opportunity is a government bond that 
will pay interest of 5% per year and the principle and interest payments are 
guaranteed by the government. Alternatively, the second investment 
opportunity is a bond issued by a small company and that bond also pays an 
annual interest of 5%. If given a choice between the two bonds, virtually all 
investors would buy the government bond rather than the small-firm bond 
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because the first is less risky while paying the same interest rate as the 
riskier second bond. In this case, an investor has no incentive to buy the 
riskier second bond. Furthermore, in order to attract capital from investors, 
the small firm issuing the second bond must pay an interest rate higher than 
5% that the government bond pays. Otherwise, no investor is likely to buy 
that bond and, therefore, the firm will be unable to raise capital. But by 
offering to pay an interest rate more than than 5%. the firm gives investors 
an incentive to buy a riskier bond. 
 
Using the discounted cash flow method, one first estimates the future cash 
flows from the investment and then estimates a reasonable discount rate 
after considering the riskiness of those cash flows and interest rates in the 
capital markets. Next, one makes a calculation to compute the present value 
of the future cash flows. 
 
Formula for valuation using DCF model 
value of firm =   
where 
• FCFF is the Free Cash Flow to the Firm (i.e. Operating cash flow 
minus capital expenditures)  
• WACC is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
• t is the time period  
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• n is the number of time periods  
• g is the growth rate  
Forecast Period 
The forecast period is the time period for which the individual yearly cash 
flows are input to the DCF formula. Cash flows after the forecast period can 
only be represented by a fixed number such as annual growth rates. There 
are no fixed rules for determining the duration of the forecast period. 
Example: 
‘MCE’ has just finished their business plan. Their goal is to provide medical 
professionals with software solutions for doing their own bookkeeping. 
Their only investor is required to wait for 5 years before making an exit. 
Therefore MCE is using a forecast period of 5 years. 
Determining the annual Cash Flow 
Cash flow is the difference between the amount of cash flowing in and out a 
company. Make sure to consistently include the different types of cash 
flows. 
Example: MCE has chosen to use only operational cash flows in 
determining their estimated yearly cash flow: 
In thousand €    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Revenues   +30 +100 +160 +330 +460 
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Personnel   -30 -80 -110 -160 -200 
Car Lease   -6 -12 -12 -18 -18 
Marketing   -10 -10 -10 -25 -30 
IT   -20 -20 -20 -25 -30 
Cash Flow   -36 -22 +8 +102 +182 
Determining Discount Factor / Rate 
Determine the appropriate discount rate and discount factor for each year of 
the forecast period based on the risk level associated with the company and 
its market. 
Example: 
MCE has chosen their discount rates based upon their company maturity. 
     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Risk Group   Seeking 
Money 
Early Startup Late Start 
Up 
Mature 
Risk Rate   50 – 100 40 – 60 30 – 50% 10- 25% 
Discount Rate   65% 55% 45% 35% 25% 
Disc. Factor   0.61 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.33 
Determining Current Value 
Calculate the current value of the future cash flows by multiplying each 
yearly cash flow by the discount factor for the year in question. This is 
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known as the time value of money (Damodaran A., 2002, “Investment 
Valuation”).  
Example: 
     Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Cash Flow   -36 -22 +8 +102 +182 
Discount Factor   0.61 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.33 
CurrentValue   € -21.96 € -9.24 € 2.64 €30.6 €60.1 
Total current value = 62.14 
Determining the Continuing Value 
Calculating cash flows after the forecast period is much more difficult as 
uncertainty, and therefore the risk factor, rises with each additional year into 
the future. The continuing value, or terminal value, is a solution that 
represents the cash flows after the forecast period. 
Example: 
MCE has chosen the perpetuity growth model to calculate the value of cash 
flows after the forecast period. They estimate that they will grow at about 
6% for the rest of these years. 
(182*1.06 / (0.25-0.06)) = 1015.34 This value however is a future value that 
still needs to be discounted to a current value: 1015.34 * 1/(1.25)^5 = 
332.72 
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Determining the Equity Value 
The equity value can be calculated by subtracting any outstanding debts 
from the total of all discounted cash flows. 
Example: 
MCE doesn’t have any debt so it only needs to add up the current value of 
the continuing value and the current value of all cash flows during the 
forecast period: 
62.14 + 332.72= 394.86 The equity value of MCE : € 394.86 
2.2 Ratio Method 
It determines the value of a firm by observing the prices of similar 
companies (guideline companies) that sold in the market. Those sales could 
be shares of stock or sales of entire firms. The observed prices serve as 
valuation benchmarks. From the prices, one calculates price multiples such 
as the price-to-earnings or price-to-book value ratios. Next, one or more 
price multiples are used to value the firm. For example, the average price-
to-earnings multiple of the guideline companies is applied to the subject 
firm's earnings to estimate its value. 
Many price multiples can be calculated. Most are based on a financial 
statement element such as a firm's earnings (price-to-earnings) or book 
value (market value-to-book value) but multiples can be based on other 
factors such as price-per-subscriber. 
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2.3 Areas of Usage 
Valuation analysis is required for many reasons including tax assessment, 
wills and estates, divorce settlements, business analysis, and basic 
bookkeeping and accounting. Since the value of things fluctuates over time, 
valuations are as of a specific date e.g., the end of the accounting quarter or 
year. They may alternatively be mark-to-market estimates of the current 
value of assets or liabilities as of this minute or this day for the purposes of 
managing portfolios and associated financial risk (Brealey, Myers, Marcus, 
“Fundamentals of Corporate Finance”). 
A few balance sheet items are much easier to value than others. Publicly 
traded stocks and bonds have prices that are quoted frequently and readily 
available. Other assets are harder to value. For instance, private firms that 
have no frequently quoted price. Additionally, financial instruments that 
have prices that are partly dependent on theoretical models of one kind or 
another are difficult to value. For example, options are generally valued 
using the Black-Scholes model while the liabilities of life assurance firms 
are valued using the theory of present value. Intangible business assets, like 
goodwill and intellectual property, are open to a wide range of value 
interpretations. 
It is possible and conventional for financial professionals to make their own 
estimates of the valuations of assets or liabilities that they are interested in. 
Their calculations are of various kinds including analyses of companies that 
focus on price-to-book, price-to-earnings, price-to-cashflow and present 
value calculations, and analyses of bonds that focus on credit ratings, 
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assessments of default risk, risk premia and levels of real interest rates. All 
of these approaches may be thought of as creating estimates of value that 
compete for credibility with the prevailing share or bond prices, where 
applicable, and may or may not result in buying or selling by market 
participants. Where the valuation is for the purpose of a merger or 
acquisition the respective businesses make available further detailed 
financial information, usually on the completion of a Non-disclosure 
agreement. 
It is very important to note that valuation is more an art than a science 
because it requires judgement: 
There are very different situations and purposes in which you value an asset 
(e.g. company in distress, tax purposes, mergers & acquisitions, quarterly 
reporting). In turn this requires different methods or a different 
interpretation of the same method each time.  
All valuation models and methods have their limitations (e.g., mathematical, 
complexity, simplicity, comparability) and could be widely criticized. As a 
general rule the valuation models are most useful when you use the same 
valuation method as the "partner" you are interacting with. In all valuation 
models there are a great number of assumptions that need to be made and 
things might not turn out the way you expect. Your best way out of that is to 
be able to explain and stand for each assumption you make;  
When a valuation is prepared all assumptions should be clearly stated, 
especially the context. It is improper, for example, to value a going concern, 
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based on an assumption that it is going out of business, since then only a 
salvage value remains. 
 
2.4 Valuation of Intangible Assets 
Valuation models can be used to value intangible assets such as patents, 
copyrights, software, trade secrets, and customer relationships. Since few 
sales of benchmark intangible assets can ever be observed, one often values 
these sorts of assets using either a present value model or estimating the 
costs to recreate it. Regardless of the method, the process is often time 
consuming and costly (Brealey, Myers, Marcus, “Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance”). 
Valuations of intangible assets are often necessary for financial reporting 
and intellectual property transactions. 
Stock markets give indirectly an estimate of a corporation's intangible asset 
value. It can be reckoned as the difference between its market capitalisation 
and its book value (by including only hard assets in it). 
There have been several new tools developed recently aiding in the 
valuation of intellectual property. The 25% Rule, Monte Carlo Analysis, and 
Derivative Revenue Model (based on license revenue) are just a few of 
these tools. Also, traditional methods such as Net Present Value, Internal 
Rate of Return, and Discounted Cash Flow can also be used. However, these 
do not take into account the "book value", or "pre-revenue" asset value of 
non income producing intellectual property. With the negotiability and 
transferability of intellectual property being liberalized by court decisions in 
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the 1990s, several valuation specialists and merchant banking organizations 
have taken up valuation and market making in intellecutual property. 
Essentially, treating intellectual property instruments as another asset class 
for investor portfolios and treating them more like securities. Several firms 
are prevalent in this field, Ocean Tomo of Chicago, Intellectual Ventures in 
Seattle, and Crais Management Group, LLC in New Orleans. They have 
initiated auctions of intellectual property blocks. This some have done as a 
percursor to their plans to create a "stock market" for intellectual property. 
Patents and trademarks would be the dominant form of security traded on 
these exchanges. To have an open market for intellectual property would 
create a more uniform and transparent form of IP valuation. The "Bid" and 
"Ask" system, many believe, is the most efficient form of valuing an asset. 
A "stock exchange" for intellectual property would change the face of 
intellectual property valuation. 
But as we can see, the firm value doesn’t only correspond to some technical 
formulas mentioned above. There is also global factors which affect 
extremely the values of companies the prices of shares. Thus, let’s see the 
reason why and how the values are affected by global situation. But before 
going deeply into the empirical studies, let’s see the global financial 
situation and cost of capital development during the 2007-2009 crisis. 
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3. GENERAL OUTLOOK ON THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS DURING 2007-2009 CRISIS 
 
The immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United 
States housing bubble which peaked  in approximately 2005–2006  (Lahart, 
Justin (2007-12-24). "Egg Cracks Differ In Housing, Finance Shells". 
WSJ.com Wall Street Journal). High default rates on "subprime" and 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), began to increase quickly thereafter. An 
increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend 
of rising housing prices had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult 
mortgages in the belief they would be able to quickly refinance at more 
favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise and housing 
prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S., 
refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and foreclosure activity 
increased dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go 
up as anticipated, and ARM interest rates reset higher. 
Share in GDP of U.S. financial sector since 1860 (Confer Thomas 
Philippon: "The future of the financial industry", Finance Department of the 
New York University Stern School of Business at New York University). 
In the years leading up to the start of the crisis in 2007, significant amounts 
of foreign money flowed into the U.S. from fast-growing economies in Asia 
and oil-producing countries. This inflow of funds made it easier for the 
Federal Reserve to keep interest rates in the United States too low from 
2002–2006 which contributed to easy credit conditions, leading to the 
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United States housing bubble. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit 
card, and auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an  
unprecedented debt load (Krugman, Paul March 2, 2009. "Revenge of the 
Glut". nytimes.com , New York Times). As part of the housing and credit 
booms, the amount of financial agreements called mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived 
their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. 
Such financial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the 
world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, 
major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in 
subprime MBS reported significant losses. Falling prices also resulted in 
homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive to 
enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 
in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the 
financial strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan 
types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing 
market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the 
trillions of U.S. dollars globally (Bernanke-Four Questions About the 
Financial Crisis). 
While the housing and credit bubbles built, a series of factors caused the 
financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile. 
Policymakers did not recognize the increasingly important role played by 
financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known 
as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had 
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become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit 
to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations 
(Geithner-Speech Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System). 
These institutions as well as certain regulated banks had also assumed 
significant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did 
not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS 
losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, 
slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial 
institutions drove central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and 
restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding 
business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial institutions 
and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant 
additional financial commitments. 
 
3.1 Complexity of Financial  Innovation  
The term financial innovation  refers to the ongoing development of 
financial products designed to achieve particular client objectives, such as 
offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the default of a borrower) or to 
assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis included: 
the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) 
for sale to investors, a type of securitization; and a form of credit insurance 
called credit default swaps(CDS). The usage of these products expanded 
dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in 
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complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of 
financial institutions. 
Certain financial innovation may also have the effect of circumventing 
regulations, such as off-balance sheet financing that affects the leverage or 
capital cushion reported by major banks. For example, Martin Wolf wrote in 
June 2009: "...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this 
decade – the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the 'shadow 
banking system' itself – was to find a way round regulation." (Wolf, Martin 
- Reform of Regulation and Incentives, Financial Times).  
 
3.2 Incorrect Pricing of The Risk and Cost of Capital Development 
During 2007-2009 Crisis 
The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by 
investors for taking on additional risk, which may be measured by interest 
rates or fees and which is implicitly essential in terms of valuation. The 
rates used for discounting the cash flows are accordingly affected by the 
pricing of the risk. For a variety of reasons, market participants did not 
accurately measure the risk inherent with financial innovation such as MBS 
and CDO's or understand its impact on the overall stability of the financial 
system ("Declaration of G20". Whitehouse.gov.us). For example, the 
pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of risk they 
introduced into the system. The average recovery rate for "high quality" 
CDOs has been approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the recovery 
rate for mezzanine CDO's has been approximately five cents for every 
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dollar. These massive, practically unthinkable, losses have dramatically 
impacted the balance sheets of banks across the globe, leaving them with 
very little capital to continue operations.  
Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various 
financial institutions through the usage of credit default swaps. The basic 
CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in exchange for a 
promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, 
AIG did not have the financial strength to support its many CDS 
commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken over by the government 
in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in 
government support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the 
money flowed to various counterparties to CDS transactions, including 
many large global financial institutions ("Bloomberg-Credit Swap 
Disclosure Obscures True Financial Risk". Bloomberg.com. 2008-11-06).  
The limitations of a widely-used financial model also were not properly 
understood . This formula assumed that the price of CDS was correlated 
with and could predict the correct price of mortgage backed securities. 
Because it was highly tractable, it rapidly came to be used by a huge 
percentage of CDO and CDS investors, issuers, and rating agencies 
(Salmon, Felix. "Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street". 
Wired Magazine). 
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder 
to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the international 
bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on them, 
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accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically 
showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be in 
practice (Norris, Floyd, News Analysis: Another Crisis, Another Guarantee, 
The New York Times, November 24, 2008). George Soros commented that 
"The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so 
complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and 
started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. 
Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the 
originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of 
responsibility." (Soros, George (January 22, 2008). "The worst market crisis 
in 60 years". Financial Times London, UK). 
 
3.3 Global Contagion 
The crisis rapidly developed and spread into a global economic shock, 
resulting in a number of European bank failures, declines in various stock 
indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities and 
commodities.  
Both MBS and CDO were purchased by corporate and institutional 
investors globally. Derivatives such as credit default swaps also increased 
the linkage between large financial institutions. Moreover, the de-leveraging 
of financial institutions, as assets were sold to pay back obligations that 
could not be refinanced in frozen credit markets, further accelerated the 
liquidity crisis and caused a decrease in international trade. 
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World political leaders, national ministers of finance and central bank 
directors coordinated their efforts to reduce fears, but the crisis continued. 
At the end of October 2008 a currency crisis developed, with investors 
transferring vast capital resources into stronger currencies such as the yen, 
the dollar and the Swiss franc, leading many emergent economies to seek 
aid from the International Monetary Fund.  
 
3.4 Global Effects 
A number of commentators have suggested that if the liquidity crisis 
continues, there could be an extended recession or worse (Goodman, Peter 
S. "Credit Enters a Lockdown". The New York Times: pp. A1). The 
continuing development of the crisis prompted fears of a global economic 
collapse (Cho, David; Appelbaum, Binyamin (2008-10-07). "Unfolding 
Worldwide Turmoil Could Reverse Years of Prosperity". The Washington 
Post: pp. A01). The financial crisis is likely to yield the biggest banking 
shakeout since the savings-and-loan meltdown. Investment bank UBS stated 
on October 6 that 2008 would see a clear global recession, with recovery 
unlikely for at least two years. Three days later UBS economists announced 
that the "beginning of the end" of the crisis had begun, with the world 
starting to make the necessary actions to fix the crisis: capital injection by 
governments; injection made systemically; interest rate cuts to help 
borrowers. The United Kingdom had started systemic injection, and the 
world's central banks were now cutting interest rates. UBS emphasized the 
United States needed to implement systemic injection. UBS further 
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emphasized that this fixes only the financial crisis, but that in economic 
terms "the worst is still to come". UBS quantified their expected recession 
durations on October 16: the Eurozone's would last two quarters, the United 
States' would last three quarters, and the United Kingdom's would last four 
quarters. The economic crisis in Iceland involved all three of the country's 
major banks. Relative to the size of its economy, Iceland’s banking collapse 
is the largest suffered by any country in economic history("Cracks in the 
crust". The Economist. Retrieved 2009-11-11).  
At the end of October, UBS revised its outlook downwards: the forthcoming  
recession would be the worst since the Reagan recession of 1981 and 1982 
with negative 2009 growth for the U.S., Eurozone, UK and Canada; very 
limited recovery in 2010; but not as bad as the Great Depression. 
All these global factors are intimately related to financial valuation  since 
the macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates are affecting 
significantly the discount rates which are used to calculate the present value 
of the cash flows. In the next section, the theoretical foundations of firm 
valuation will be analysed in detail and we will see how the results are 
deviating from the estimations because of the global market anomalies. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
VALUATION 
 
A model for estimating
series of dividends that grow at a constant rate. Given a dividend per share 
that is payable in one year, and
constant rate in perpetuity, the model solves for the present value of the 
infinite series of future dividends
Where:  
D = Expected dividend per share one year from now
k = Required rate of return for equity investor
G = Growth rate in dividends (in perpetuity)
It's one of the basic applications of 
model requires loads of assumptions about companies' dividend payments 
and growth patterns, as well as future interest rates. Difficulties spri
the search for sensible numbers to fold into the equation
Modigliani F., 1961)
Here is the basic idea: any stock is ultimately worth no more than what it 
will provide investors in current and future dividends. Financial theory says
that the value of a stock is worth all of the future cash flows expected to be 
generated by the firm, discounted by an appropriate risk
OF FIRM 
: DIGGING INTO THE GORDON MODEL
 the intrinsic value of a stock, based on a future 
 the assumption that the dividend grows at
 (Gordon M. J., 1959).  
 
 
 
 
the financial theory. Unfortunately, 
 (Miller M. H., 
. 
-adjusted rate. 
 
 a 
the 
ng up in 
 
According to the D
that are returned to the sharehol
We get to the formula above
The obvious shortcoming of the model above is that 
companies to grow over time. If 
denominator equals the expected return less the dividend growth rate. This 
is known as the constant growth D
Model after its creator, Myron Gordon. 
The point is that t
valuing a mature company that pays a hefty portion of its earnings as 
dividends, such as a 
 
Assumptions Causing A Dilemma 
Proponents of the dividend discount model say that only future cash 
dividends can give you a reliable estimate of a company's intrinsic value. 
In truth, the dividend discount model requires an enormous amount of 
speculation in trying to forecast future dividends. Even when you apply it to 
steady, reliable, dividend
of assumptions about their future.
ividend Discount Model, dividends are the cash flows 
der (Gordon M. J., 1959).  
 by applying the formula for a perpetuity:
 
we would expect most 
we think this is the case, then the 
ividend Discount Model or the Gordon 
 
 
 
he classic dividend discount model works best when 
public company (Miller M. H., Modigliani F., 1961)
of Forecasting 
-paying companies, you still need to make plenty 
 However the model is only as good as the 
 
.  
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assumptions it is based upon. Furthermore, the inputs that produce 
valuations are always changing and susceptible to error.  
The first big assumption of the Dividend Discount Model is that dividends 
are steady, or grow at a constant rate indefinitely. But even for steady, 
reliable, utility-type stocks, it can be tricky to forecast exactly what the 
dividend payment will be next year, never mind a dozen years from now. 
 
Multi-Stage Models  
To get around the problem posed by un-steady dividends, multi-stage 
models take the Dividend Discount Model a step closer to reality by 
assuming that the company will experience differing growth phases. Stock 
analysts build complex forecast models with many phases of differing 
growth to better reflect real prospects. For example, a multi-stage DDM 
may predict that a company will have a dividend that grows at 5% for seven 
years, 3% for the following three years and then at 2% in perpetuity.  
However, such an approach brings even more assumptions into the model - 
although it doesn't assume that a dividend will grow at a constant rate, it 
must guess when and by how much a dividend will change over time. 
Another sticking point is that no one really knows for certain the appropriate 
expected rate of return to use. It's not always wise simply to use the long-
term interest rate because the appropriateness of this one can vary. 
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Problem of High-Growth 
No DDM model is able to solve the problem of high-growth stocks. If the 
company's dividend growth rate exceeds the expected return rate, you 
cannot calculate a value - because you get a negative denominator in the 
formula. Stocks don't have a negative value. Consider a company with a 
dividend growing at 20% while the expected return rate is only 5%: in the 
denominator (r-g) you would have -15% (5%-20%) 
In fact, even if the growth rate does not exceed the expected return rate, 
growth stocks, which don't pay dividends, are even tougher to value using 
this model. If you hope to value a growth stock with the dividend discount 
model, your valuation will be based on nothing more than predictions about 
the company's future profits and dividend policy decisions. Most growth 
stocks don't pay out dividends. Rather, they re-invest earnings into the 
company with the hopes of providing shareholders with returns by means of 
a higher share price.  
Consider Microsoft, which didn't pay a dividend for decades. Given this 
fact, the model might suggest the company was worthless at that time - 
which is completely absurd. Remember, only about a third of all public 
companies bother to pay dividends. Furthermore, even companies that do 
offer payouts are allocating less and less of their earnings to shareholders. 
 
Finally, the dividend discount model is by no means the be-all and end-all 
for valuation (Brennan M., 1971). That being said, learning about the 
dividend discount model does encourage thinking. It forces investors to 
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evaluate different assumptions about growth and future prospects (Myers S. 
C., 2001). The challenge is to make the model as applicable to reality as 
possible, which means using the most reliable assumptions possible. 
 
4.1 Optimal Capital Structure 
Capital structure implies the way that a corporation finances its assets 
through some combination of equity, debt, or  securities. A firm's capital 
structure is then the composition or 'structure' of its liabilities. For example, 
a firm which sells $10 billion in equity and $40 billion in debt is said to be 
20% equity-financed and 80% debt-financed. The firm's ratio of debt to total 
financing, 80% in this example, is referred to the firm's leverage. In reality, 
capital structure may be highly complex and include lots of sources. 
 
4.2 Criticism of Gordon Model by Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
This theorem states that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and 
asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is 
unaffected by how that firm is financed. It does not matter if the firm's 
capital is raised by issuing stock or selling debt (Modigliani F., Miller M. 
H., 1958). It does not matter what the firm's dividend policy is. Therefore, 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem is also often called the capital structure 
irrelevance principle. 
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Propositions : 
The theorem was originally proven under the assumption of no taxes. It is 
made up of two propositions which can also be extended to a situation with 
taxes (Modigliani F., Miller M. H., 1958). 
Consider two firms which are identical except for their financial structures. 
The first (Firm U) is unlevered: that is, it is financed by equity only. The 
other (Firm L) is levered: it is financed partly by equity, and partly by debt. 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that the value of the two firms is the 
same. 
 
Proposition I : 
 
                d(t) + p(t+1) – p(t) 
R = Rate of return  =  ----------------------------- 
                           p(t) 
 
n(t) : number of shares 
m(t+1) : number of newly issued shares that are sold at price p(t+1) 
n(t+1) : n(t) + m(t+1) 
V(t) : n(t).p(t) = firm value 
D(t) : n(t).d(t) = total dividend  
                     1 
V(t) = n(t).p(t) = --------- [ D(t) + V(t+1) – m(t+1).p(t+1)] 
                  1 + R 
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I(t) : amount for the investment under consideration 
X(t) : total profit for the term 
Then, 
m(t+1).p(t+1) = I(t) – ( X(t) – D(t) ) 
     1 
V(t) = ----------- [ D(t) + V(t+1) – I(t) + X(t) – D(t) ] 
 1 + R(t) 
     1 
V(0) = ---------- [ V(1) + X(0) – I(0) ] 
 1 + R(0) 
       1 
V(1) = ----------- [ V(2) + X(1) – I(1) ] 
  1 + R(1) 
. 
. 
. 
. 
       1      }                    T    X(i) – I(i) 
V(T) = ------------ [ V(T+1) + X(T) – I(T) ]  }  V(0) = ∑ -------------------     
   1 + R(T)     }            1      (1 + R)^i                
 
  Dividend policy does not affect the current value of the firm 
 
 
 34
Proposition II : 
Capital structure doesn’t affect the firm’s value.  
         
X(i) 
V(i) = S(i) + D(i) = ----------    for any firm in class k. 
   R(k) 
X(i) : firm i’s expected profit 
D(i) : firm i’s market value of debt 
S(i) : firm i’s market value of common shares 
V(i) : S(i) + D(i) : firm i’s market value 
 
Proof by arbitrage : 
V(1) = S(1) / X 
V(2) = S(2) + D(2)  / X 
 r (cost of debt) 
Assume that V(2) > V(1) 
µ : proportion of investment 
S(1) : total market capitalization 
Y : expected return 
s(i) = µ.S(i)   s(2) = µ.S(2) 
Y(2) = µ.( X – r.D(2) )      
     µ.S(2) + µ.D(2) 
µ.S(2) + µ.D(2)   ------------------------------- = shares acquired in firm 1 
    S(1) 
 35
     µ.S(2) + µ.D(2)    µ.V(2) 
Y(1) = -------------------------- X  = ------------- X 
   S(1)      V(1) 
 
If the interest expenses are deducted : 
   µ.V(2) 
------------ X - µ.r.D(2)    Since V(2) > V(1) ; Y(1) > Y(2) 
      V(1) 
 
This discussion also clarifies the role of some of the theorem's assumptions. 
We have implicitly assumed that the investor's cost of borrowing money is 
the same as that of the firm, which does not need to be true in the presence 
of asymmetric information or in the absence of efficient markets (Brennan 
M., 1971). 
These results might seem irrelevant (after all, none of the conditions are met 
in the real world), but the theorem is still taught and studied because it tells 
us something very important. That is, capital structure matters precisely 
since one or more of these assumptions are violated. It tells us where to look 
for determinants of optimal capital structure and how those factors might 
affect optimal capital structure (Myers S. C., 2001). 
 
4.3 Comparison and Criticism of Both Two Models 
After the issuance of Gordon Model and its counterpart theoreme 
Modigliani-Miller Theoreme, many comparisons and critics have been made 
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for both two fundemental financial theories. Michael Brennan, in his article 
named “A Note On Dividend Irrelevance and The Gordon Valuation 
Model”, remarks : “…the Gordon’s argument does in fact rest upon a 
confounding of the effects of dividend policy and investment policy ; and 
secondly, the M-M dividend irrelevance theorem can be derived from a 
somewhat weaker assumption than that of symmetric market 
rationality”(Brennan M., 1971).   
Besides, Stewart C. Myers, in 2001, in his article named “Capital Structure” 
prevails that capital structure matters, contrary to what Modigliani-Miller 
predicted in 1950’s, saying: “The Modigliani-Miller theory may be intuitive, 
but is it credible ? Are capital markets really sufficiently perfect ? After all, 
the values of pizzas do depend on how they are sliced. Consumers are 
willing to pay more  for the several  slices  than for the equivalent whole. 
Perhaps the value of the firm does depend on how its assets, cash flows  and 
growth opportunities are sliced up and offered to investors as debt and 
equity claims. We see constant innovation in the design  of securities  and in 
new  financing schemes. Innovation proves that financing can matter. If new 
securities of financing tactics never added value, then there would be no 
incentive to innovate”(Myers S. C., 2001).  
Stewart C. Myers also points out that the human capital is another essential 
factor in terms of capital structure and adds that it is as important as the 
financing capital is as well and emphasizes : “I emphasize “present value” 
because insiders are investing and developing human capital in the 
expectation of future payoffs. The investment comes in the form of personal 
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risk-taking, sweat equity (working extra-hard for less than  an outside 
wage) and by the specialization of human capital to the firm. So a general  
financial theory  of the firm would model the coinvestment of human and 
financial capital. ………”(Myers S. C., 2001). 
 
4.4 How to Implement All These Theories and Discussions into Real 
Calculations ? 
Since the beginning of this study, I try to explain the various approaches, 
theories and approaches for making the most accurate forecasts of the ideal 
capital structure and of cost of equity. But as we can see, I can cavalierly 
say that there is no ideal way to estimate the cost of equity. Every method or 
theory brings up its advantages and its inconveniences as well when they are 
deeply analyzed. So, what do we have to do in order to be able to estimate 
accurately ? Is there any other new method which can provide us the best 
solution. As Stewart C. Myers and Michael Brennan assorted, there is no 
ideal forecasting model. Neither Gordon Model nor Modigliani-Miller 
model are the exact solutions. Each of them have their own path of 
application and circumstances in which they are doing well.  
Thus, in the further part of my study, I’ll try to estimate the cost of equity, 
of some local Turkish companies listed on IMKB, by the Gordon Model; 
then will calculate the realized cost of equity by using the financial data on 
their balance sheet and will interpret the differences between the two 
outcomings.  But first of all, I’ll try to observe deeper the concept of equity 
and the cost of equity. 
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5. THE COST OF EQUITY APPROACH AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
First of all we have to understand the whole idea of equity (Hongren, 
Harrison, Bamber).  
The terminology used to decscript the equity : 
- A stock or any other security representing an ownership interest.  
- On a company's balance sheet, the amount of the funds contributed by the 
owners (the stockholders) plus the retained earnings (or losses). Also 
referred to as "shareholders' equity". 
- In the context of margin trading, the value of securities in a margin 
account minus what has been borrowed from the brokerage.  
- In the context of real estate, the difference between the current market 
value of the property and the amount the owner still owes on the mortgage. 
It is the amount that the owner would receive after selling a property and 
paying off the mortgage.  
- In terms of investment strategies, equity (stocks) is one of the principal 
asset classes. The other two are fixed-income (bonds) and cash/cash-
equivalents. These are used in asset allocation planning to structure a 
desired risk and return profile for an investor's portfolio.  
The term's meaning depends very much on the context. In finance, in 
general, you can think of equity as ownership in any asset after all debts 
associated with that asset are paid off. For example, a car or house with no 
outstanding debt is considered the owner's equity because he or she can 
readily sell the item for cash. Stocks are equity because they represent 
ownership in a company.
5.1  Cost Of Equity
In financial theory, the return that stockholders require for a company. The 
traditional formula for cost of equity (COE) is the dividend capitalization 
model:  
 
A firm's cost of equity represents the compensation that the market demands 
in exchange for owning the asset and bearing the risk of ownership
(Brealey, Myers, Marcus, “Funda
Example:  
Let's say you require a rate of return of 10% on an investment 
in XXX Sports. The stock is currently trading at $10 and will pay a dividend 
of $0.30. Through a combination of dividends and share appreciation you 
require a $1.00 return on your $10.00 investment. Therefore the stock will 
have to appreciate by $0.70, which,
dividends, gives you your 10% cost of equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mentals of Corporate Finance”).
 combined with the $0.30 from 
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5.2  Cost of Equity in Accounting 
In accounting, the realized cost of equity is the minimum desired rate of 
return on invested capital that is determined by calculating net income as a 
percentage of invested capital (Joel G. Siegel, Ph.D., CPA, and Jae K. Shim, 
Ph.D., published by Barron's Educational Series, 4th edition, Dictionary of 
Accounting Terms) : 
Net income / Invested Capital 
And the Invested Capital represents the total cash investment that 
shareholders and debtholders have made in a company (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen, “Principles of Corporate Finance”, 8th edition, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2005). There are two different but completely equivalent methods for 
calculating invested capital. The operating approach is calculated as: 
Invested capital = Operating Net Working Capital + Net PP&E + 
Capitalized Operating Leases + Other Operating Assets + Operating 
Intangibles – Other Operating Liabilities – Cumulative Adjustment for 
Amortization of R&D 
Equivalently, the financing approach is calculated as: 
Invested capital = Total Debt and Leases  
+ Total Equity and Equity Equivalents  
– Non-Operating Cash and Investments  
In symbols: 
K = D + E – M 
Example : 
Current Operating Assets 2,000
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(Non-Interest Bearing Current Liabilities)        (800)  
Net Working Capital 1,200  
   
 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment 4,800
 
PV of Non-Capitalized Lease Obligations 400
 
Goodwill and Intangibles 1,600  
 
 
Invested Capital 8,000  
 
  
Short Term Debt 300
 
Current Portion 500
 
Long Term Debt 2,300
 
PV of Non-Capitalized Lease Obligations 400
 
Total Debt and Leases 3,500
 
   
 
Common Stock 600
 
Additional Paid-In Capital 1,900
 
Retained Earnings 1,500
 
Bad Debt Reserve 200
 
LIFO Reserve 500
 
Capitalized R&D Expense 1,000
 
Capitalized Marketing Expense 300
 
Total Equity and Equity Equivalents 6,000
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Total Capital 9,500
 
(Marketable Securities)      (1,500) 
   
 
Invested Capital 8,000
 
 
5.3 Practical Application for Comparison between The Cost of Equity 
Estimated by Gordon Model and The Realized Cost of Equity 
In this section I will analyze the financial data of some companies and will 
compare theie estimated costs of equity by Gordon Model and realized costs 
of equity. I want to begin with Pınar Entegre Et ve Un Sanayi A.Ş. 
(PETUN) since it is a regularly dividend distributing company. I used the 
financial statements of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 since 2009 results 
haven’t been declared out yet.  
In order to be able to make the necessary analysis, I derived benefit from the 
establishment of the proforma financial statements. I used the “Percentage 
of Sales Method” to prepare them.  
In the next page, you can see the estimation window which I created to 
make forecastings. 
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First of all, I estimated the growth rate of sales :  
The sales have grown by 2% in 2004; 2,84% in 2005; 12,93% in 2006 and 
13,64% in 2007. Hence, I projected the sales growth would be by 12% in 
2008, considering the global and national macroeconomical situation and 
approximating to the realized rates in 2006 and 2007. 
And respectively I forecasted the income statement for 2008. As can be seen 
in the previous table, sales revenue in 2008 is estimated to be 314.664 TL; 
thus the cost of sales is assumed to decrease to 76% from 78%. The rest is 
proportioned  to Net Sales respectively : 
 
 
 
Preparing the proforma 2008 balance sheet, I served from the 2007 ratios 
and I adopted them to the forecasted sales level in 2008. You can see the 
proforma balance for 2008 on the next page : 
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I predicted that the current assets of the company will increase in 2008. 
Hence, considering that Current Assets / Sales ratio was 35% in 2004, 36% 
in 2005, 18% in 2006 and 21% in 2007; I estimated that the assets would 
begin to increase and would be converging to its past levels. So I decided to 
forecast it as 25% for 2008. In opposition to the current assets, the non-
current assets were decreasing since 2004, which pushed me to forecast the 
Non-Current Assets / Sales ratio would be 70% in 2008.  
Short-term Liabilities / Sales ratio was decreasing since 2004 ; however I 
thought that the short-term financing would be gathering more importance 
relying on the global effects and I forecasted the Short-term Liabilities / 
Sales ratio would be 15% which was a little bit higher than 2007.  
Net Profit Margin is deducted from the Proforma Income Statement which 
is also made according to Percentage of Sales like the balance sheet does 
and is estimated to be 12% by dividing estimated net income by the 
estimated sales.  
The Pay-out Ratio (dividend paid / net income) is decreasing since 2004 ; 
thus the Retention Ratio (retained earnings / net income) tends to be 
increasing in opposition to the pay-out ratio and the pay-out ratio for 2008 is 
estimated to be 65% and the retention ratio to be 35% respectively.  
So, the forecasted net income for 2008 is 37.759.732 TL and the forecasted 
dividend amount for 2008 is 19.765.324,15 TL (relying on the assumption 
that the pay-out ratio will be 65% in 2008). Hence, the estimated dividend 
growth rate for 2008 is : 
Dividend estimated to be paid in 2008 →  19.765.324,15 TL 
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divided by ; 
Dividend paid in 2007 →  15.600.550 TL 
(19.765.324,15 / 15.600.550 ) – 1 = 27%  
So, according to the Gordon Model,  
 
The next year’s dividend per share = estimated dividend per share in 2008   
= Dividend estimated to be paid in 2008 / number of shares outstanding = 
19.765.324,15 / 43.335.000 = 0,46 TL  
Thus; 
Cost of equity (Gordon Model) = (0,46 / market value of stock at the end of 
2007) + 0,27  
         = (0,46 / 4,38) + 27% = 37,5% 
Let’s now calculate the realized cost of equity according the year-end 
balance sheet items in 2008 (see appendix for PETUN): 
Realized cost of equity in 2008 = Net income in 2008 / invested capital in 
2008 
      = 31.729.940 TL / (total debt + total equity–  
     non-operating cash and investments) 
    = 31.729.940 / [74.057.560 + 236.097.859 – (-36.501.423       
+ 1.810.078)] 
        = 9,2%  
As we can see, there is a huge deviation between the cost of equity 
estimated according to Gordon Model and the realized one. I will try to 
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explain the reasons of such a big difference but before that, I made the same 
work for some other listed companies too and the results gathered are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
Let’s now estimate the cost of equity of Sabanci Holding for 2008 according 
to Gordon Model, relying on the 2005, 2006 and 2007 datas (see appendix 
for SAHOL) : 
Sabanci Holding paid out 149.055 as dividend and gathered a net income 
494.049 in 2006. In 2007, the dividend paid is 189.399 and net income is 
969.487  
The dividend growth rate for 2007 is : (189.399 / 149.055) – 1 = 27% 
Hence I assume that the dividend growth rate for 2008 will be 
approximately 25%, relying on the observations that the rate was 22% for 
2006 and 27% for 2007 respectively. 
So, estimated Cost of equity for 2008 = (estimated dividend per share in 
2008 / market value of stock in 2007) + growth rate of dividends   
        = [(189.399 x 1,25 / 1.800.000) / 
6,45] + 0,25 = 27% 
And now we will see the realized results in 2008 (see appendix for SAHOL) 
and calculate the realized cost of equity of Sabanci Holding for 2008 : 
Realized cost of equity in 2008 = Net income 2008 / invested capital  
= 1.188.559 / (83.482.647 + 17.338.777 – (-7.657.855) – 2.727.715) = 
1,12% 
Here we can see a  huge variance from the estimated cost of equity like we 
did in the first example too.  
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Let’s now go on with another local listed company, Koç Holding A.Ş. (see 
appendix for KCHOL) and estimate the cost of equity of Koc Holding for 
2008 according to Gordon Model, relying on the 2005, 2006 and 2007  
datas : 
Koc Holding paid out 5.421 as dividend and gathered a net income 560.812 
in 2006. In 2007, the dividend paid is 4.191 and net income is 2.295.419  
The dividend growth rate for 2007 is : (4.191 / 5.421) – 1 = -22,6% 
Hence I assumed that the dividend growth rate for 2008 will be 
approximately -15%, relying on the observations that the rate was -94% for 
2006 and -22,6% for 2007 respectively. 
But since the theory does not support a negative growth rate for dividends 
(no one will invest in a stock which has a negative estimation of dividend 
growth) I had to change my assumption as 15%.  So, estimated Cost of 
equity for 2008 = (estimated dividend per share in 2008 / market value of 
stock in 2007) + growth rate of dividends   
        = [(4.191 x 0,85 / 1.745.700) / 6,35] 
+ (0,15) = 15% 
And now we will see the realized results in 2008 (see appendix for KCHOL) 
calculate the realized cost of equity of Koc Holding for 2008 : 
Realized cost of equity in 2008 = Net income 2008 / invested capital  
= 2.023.555 / (64.890.083 – (-2.516.940) – 6.740.554) = 3,3% 
 
Let’s now go on with Dogan Holding  (see appendix for DOHOL) : 
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The realized dividend growth rate for 2007 is -97%. Thus, I assume that the 
rate will be -50% for 2008. So, the case of KCHOL is valid for DOHOL 
too. Since the theory does not support a negative growth rate for dividends 
(no one will invest in a stock which has a negative estimation of dividend 
growth) I had to change my assumption as 10%. 
Estimated cost of equity for 2008 = (3.463.000 x 0,50 / 1.500.000.000) / 
2,22 + (0,10) =  
           = 10% 
And let’s see the realized cost of equity in 2008 (see appendix for DOHOL): 
Realized cost of equity = 70.615 / [2.969.625 + 2.933.018 + 4.705.824 – (-
733.865) – 375.329 – 1.264]    = 0,64% 
We have gathered a similar result to previous examples, which is not 
surprising for Dogan Holding either. Let’s now go on with GÜBRE 
FABRĐKALARI T.A.Ş. (see appendix for GUBRF) : 
I estimate the dividend growth rate for 2008 as 50% relying on the 2006 and 
2007 observations. Hence, 
Estimated cost of equity = (5.265.544 x 1,5 / 22.498.573) / 8,80 + 0,50 = 
53,98% 
And the realized results; 
Realized cost of equity = 103.341.077 / [561,253,951 + 566,711,407 + 
729,920,130 –            (-490,328,373) - 80,203,277 - 2,190,577] = 4,56% 
Let’s now make the same study for Bolu Cimento A.Ş. (see appendix for 
BOLUC) : 
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Estimated dividend growth for 2008 is 50%, thus estimated cost of equity 
for 2008 = (58.610.835 x 1,50 / 128.564.800) / 2,28 + 0,50 = 80% 
And the results in 2008 : 
Realized cost of equity in 2008 = 39.281.163 / (15,275,300 + 2,669,548 + 
205,906,039 - 16,306,546 - (-40,414,883) - 11,674,201) = 16,62%  
 
FINAL TABLE 
 
  ESTIMATED COST of EQUITY  REALIZED COST of EQUITY 
     
PETUN  37%  9,2% 
     
SAHOL  27%  1,1% 
     
KCHOL  15%  3,3% 
     
DOHOL  10%  0,7% 
     
GUBRF  54%  4,6% 
 
BOLUC 
  
80% 
  
16,6% 
 
So, we can see a  huge variance from the estimated cost of equity in all 
examples. 
I will now try to investigate the reasons of this divergence between the costs 
of equity estimated  according to Gordon model and the realized costs of 
equity calculated  according to items on the balance sheets. 
The common  problem is that the non-operating cash is negative for all 
considered companies which reflects that they have initiated some 
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investment activities which creates a negative cash flow from investment 
acitivities. 
There may be various factors such as borrowing rates, impredictable interest 
rates, extended credit loan terms, etc. However, I’ll try to explain the global 
macroeconomical situation in the latest years that might have been causing 
this anomalies in those factors and in the above-mentioned calculations 
respectively since these factors play essential role in the deviation and the 
variance of the discount rates which causes real severe problems of 
estimation and forecasting. 
 
5.4  Criticism of The Dividend Policies 
We learn several things from the previous studies about the dividend policy 
of Turkish companies.  
In all cases, profitability affects dividend payments. High return on equity 
means high dividend payments. This provides strong support for the residual 
cash flow theory of dividends that firms with high cash flow pay high 
dividends and vice versa. 
High debt ratios mean  low dividend payments. Which means that financial 
constraints are real and affect financial policy. Although Fama and French 
(1997) find that debt is the residual, the results indicate that there is an effect 
on dividend policy as well. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This study concludes that whichever valuation technic is used, the firm 
values didn’t only correspond to generally accepted valuation technics or 
only to Gordon Model but they also  corresponded  to some other global 
factors in 2008. In terms of cost of equity, there might have been several 
reasons fort the deviation of the realized cost of equity from  the estimated 
one. First of all, my estimations about the dividend growth rate, even though 
relying on the historical data, may not be accurate enough to make a 
successful forecasting. Even if I tried to be as rational as possible, I ought to 
have behaved unnecessarily analogic. I made my estimations according to 
calculations with historical datas but we can clearly prevail that, regarding 
the realized results in 2008, there must have been some factors which had 
deviated the forecasts. In fact, I think the global macroeconomic situation 
created really outstanding anomalies in the financial markets and the real 
industries as well which could have affected the estimations. The anomalies 
in the financial markets implicitly influenced the real sector and frankly 
speaking they have been going on affecting since then. And we can roughly 
presume that these circumstances will continue in 2010 and in 2011 as well. 
The interest and discount rates have been going on being seriously affected 
since 2001 and are tending to be affected in the coming periods. Thus, it has 
been and will be very stringent for the financial analysts to make 
estimations and forecasts. And in the empirical study we made in the 
previous sections, some of  the realized costs of equity were smaller than the 
realized growth rates, which makes the denominator on Gordon’s Formula 
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negative. In that case, the realized market price per share of some companies 
(ex: SAHOL) must have been negative which is impossible. These results 
may vary according to the market they occur. This kind of deviations are 
generally happening to be especially in the emerging markets such as 
Turkey. Thus the market prices of shares diversified as per various global 
factors in 2008. Besides, the discount rate in the denominator of Gordon 
Formula implies that any decrease in the discount rates will augment the 
share’s price and vice-versa. However, we can roughly see that didn’t 
happen  that way : even though the discount  rates were decreasing  in 2008, 
the market prices of the shares were diminishing  too. Thus, we can 
explicitly presume that the Gordon Model can be efficient in some cases and 
can also be inefficient in some different ones. Hence it is very difficult to 
make strict and sharp comments about the efficiency and/or efficacity of this 
fundamental model. 
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